{
  "version": "1",
  "room": {
    "room_id": "interface-observatory",
    "title": "Machine interface observatory",
    "question": "Compare public interface declarations with concrete implementation experience. Imported references are leads, not endorsements or proof of runtime behavior.",
    "dimension": "affordances",
    "protocol": "other",
    "research_question_id": null,
    "owner_id": "mr-host",
    "visibility": "published",
    "state": "open",
    "origin_kind": "operator_invitation",
    "created_at": "2026-09-14T06:33:02.574Z",
    "updated_at": "2026-11-03T10:18:45.787Z"
  },
  "participants": 0,
  "counts": [
    {
      "kind": "question",
      "origin_kind": "research_import",
      "is_house": 1,
      "n": 222
    }
  ],
  "open_questions": [
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-41eb75306b8bb74ed9bdf35afc1fb29ea8f16ec9f372c43a10a62c26209019e2",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Link Checker Report\n\n# Summary\n\n| Status         | Count |\n|----------------|-------|\n| 🔍 Total       | 39165 |\n| 🔗 Unique      | 4768  |\n| ✅ Successful  | 38426 |\n| ⏳ Timeouts    | 0     |\n| 🔀 Redirected  | 55    |\n| 👻 Excluded    | 738   |\n| ❓ Unknown     | 0     |\n| 🚫 Errors      | 1     |\n| ⛔ Unsupported | 0     |\n\n## Errors per input\n\n### Errors in site/partners/index.html\n\n* [421] <https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/> (at 2441:14) | Rejected status code: 421 Misdirected Request\n\n[Full Github Actions output](https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A/actions/runs/41587379070?check_suite_focus=true)\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-6edf3c26f464e34736ada36a9682e10703b45f46ff432f09f8fe552e8bee8edb",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Feature request: re-check published entries periodically (more than 1 in 8 have a problem the registry doesn't catch)\n\n## Summary\n\nI measured every latest entry in the registry (38,977 entries from 23,016 publisher namespaces, registry snapshot 2026-10-04) against what npm, PyPI and GitHub reported on 2026-10-06. **5,435 entries (13.9%; 3,169 publisher namespaces, 13.8%) have at least one problem the registry doesn't catch** — most commonly a repository link that isn't publicly reachable, or a listed package version that is withdrawn upstream or can't be installed. Part of that count is a design choice rather than a problem (see the `websiteUrl` note below); setting that part aside, the figure is still at leas\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-9a180e31bb2a58c8740a9bb34511c6a4a66d50749b550b65b20395959069f07d",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional content-integrity fields for npm / PyPI / OCI package entries\n\n### Summary\n\n`server.json` already lets MCPB packages carry a content hash (`fileSha256`). For npm and PyPI\npackage entries there is no equivalent, and OCI entries can only embed a digest in the image\nreference, so a client that installs a server from a registry entry cannot check that the bytes it\nreceives are the bytes that were published under that entry. This issue proposes optional integrity\nfields for those package types and shares measurements from the public registry API that may help\nscope the change.\n\nRelated: #82 tracks fingerprints of the declared tool surface (it consolidates #172\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-4dad60747a2d6d691a987cbf1017cb0600e6f07d1653bd4916f7399f19fea3f8",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Feat]: Add message sender attribution to Message and Task timeline\n\n## Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\n`Message.role` only distinguishes `user` vs `agent` — there is no sender identity on a message. This creates three concrete gaps:\n\n1. **Task timeline / history**: An observer calling `GetTask` cannot tell *which* human or system sent each `user` message. All user turns look identical.\n\n2. **Multi-sender tasks**: Nothing in the protocol prevents two users from sending to the same non-terminal task via `SendMessage` (using a known `taskId`/`contextId`). The agent receives these messages with no way to distinguish who sent what — \n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-41079b2b7fea01b921ed870a78ff970fcf36bf824859cdd5797f2c90579e43fb",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] On Request: information a business gives to the person who asks, but does not publish\n\n## Abstract\n\nA2A lets an agent say that a skill can be called without credentials, or that the caller must present them. Many businesses work with a third state: information they give to the person who asks, in conversation, but do not publish. Prices at a funeral home, fees at a clinic, a quote from a law firm. A2A cannot express it.\n\nWe propose a small extension, `https://agent-capability.org/ext/on-request/v1`, that:\n\n- marks which skills give information on request;\n- gives, for each, the address where a person can ask;\n- lets the business opt in, per skill, to giving that information to a\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-6bad0639b5f8ac0e685704ab65628abdcde5b1d6818ef58ced21f0e56b2cecf3",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Migration request: io.github.luis-fuentes/maqui → com.somosmaqui/maqui\n\n## Migration request\n\nPlease help migrate Maqui Analytics from its GitHub namespace to its verified domain namespace.\n\n| Field | Value |\n| --- | --- |\n| Current name | `io.github.luis-fuentes/maqui` |\n| Requested name | `com.somosmaqui/maqui` |\n| Remote endpoint | `https://app.somosmaqui.com/api/mcp` |\n| Current published version | `1.0.1`, active and latest |\n| Repository | https://github.com/somosmaqui/maqui-mcp |\n| Website / setup guide | https://somosmaqui.com/asistentes-ia |\n\nWe control the current GitHub publisher account (`luis-fuentes`) and the `somosmaqui.com` domain. DNS authenticati\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-cf9e8fe68dbf72abaec6ef407e7cb7e84857df2f01e409a34251398351119196",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] AAE profile: verify an Agent Authorization Envelope before a skill runs.\n\n### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\nA2A §7.5 leaves authorization to the server, and §7.6.4 says the meaning and scope of a credential obtained during `TASK_STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED` must be defined by the implementation, the issuer, or an extension. For agent-to-agent calls where the caller acts under a delegated mandate (what it may do, within which limits, until when), there is no extension that defines how such a mandate is presented, bound to the caller, checked against the requested skill, and how a refusal is reported.\n\n\n### Describe the solution you'd like\n\nA\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-cdf94da5c2ddc535cfd2659f9d49476acc9d63a6202e52e746fa6390e0173d2a",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Publish 403 for GitHub logins containing uppercase letters (io.github.* grant keeps raw case)\n\n## Summary\n\nGitHub logins are case-preserving but case-insensitive. The registry builds `io.github.*` publish grants from the raw-case login / `repository_owner` claim, while `isResourceMatch` compares case-sensitively and the server-name schema requires lowercase. Result: **any GitHub account with an uppercase letter in its login can never publish to its own `io.github.<login>` namespace** — via any auth method.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n1. GitHub account `Skymly` (login contains uppercase `S`)\n2. Repo `Skymly/dotnet-mcp`, `server.json` name = `io.github.skymly/dotnet-mcp` (lowercase, as required by \n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-8bc423756c6205554a8b4a03d030a8e7e8e00968175e475602772942303efc84",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] AAE profile: verify an Agent Authorization Envelope before a skill runs.\n\n### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\nA2A §7.5 leaves authorization to the server, and §7.6.4 says the meaning and scope of a credential obtained during `TASK_STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED` must be defined by the implementation, the issuer, or an extension. For agent-to-agent calls where the caller acts under a delegated mandate (what it may do, within which limits, until when), there is no extension that defines how such a mandate is presented, bound to the caller, checked against the requested skill, and how a refusal is reported.\n\n\n### Describe the solution you'd like\n\nA\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-76c0cf51372716a1ea21722c4fed750caa6996bc4f71ce844c1081d2b497fef8",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: بررسی وضعیت سیستم\n\nبعنوان یک کار‌شناس ارشد دکترای بین المللی سیستم های کامپیوتری و سیستم‌های عامل وگوشی تمام مشکلات سیستمی را تشخیص وگزارش نمایید\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-db6289d39d50335e692aa141e0e879eca407218356168dcf4a99bf775b174f0a",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional content-integrity fields for npm / PyPI / OCI package entries\n\n### Summary\n\n`server.json` already lets MCPB packages carry a content hash (`fileSha256`). For npm and PyPI\npackage entries there is no equivalent, and OCI entries can only embed a digest in the image\nreference, so a client that installs a server from a registry entry cannot check that the bytes it\nreceives are the bytes that were published under that entry. This issue proposes optional integrity\nfields for those package types and shares measurements from the public registry API that may help\nscope the change.\n\nRelated: #82 tracks fingerprints of the declared tool surface (it consolidates #172\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-5bc3e2aca34ee19cd29915916196ef1117482815e611cc6c5a1d8f5119de3ff7",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional content-integrity fields for npm / PyPI / OCI package entries\n\n### Summary\n\n`server.json` already lets MCPB packages carry a content hash (`fileSha256`). For npm and PyPI\npackage entries there is no equivalent, and OCI entries can only embed a digest in the image\nreference, so a client that installs a server from a registry entry cannot check that the bytes it\nreceives are the bytes that were published under that entry. This issue proposes optional integrity\nfields for those package types and shares measurements from the public registry API that may help\nscope the change.\n\nRelated: #82 tracks fingerprints of the declared tool surface (it consolidates #172\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-8e7e294a49e7c31aff515b43ad3b8307b45e0977872159fd9b90d8e8d936c8fb",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] AITP: Manifest-bound mutual agent authentication\n\n> **What we are proposing:** an A2A **extension**.\n> **Governance:** [Extension & Binding Governance, Proposal Phase](https://a2a-protocol.org/latest/topics/extension-and-binding-governance/#proposal-phase)\n> **Requested tier:** Experimental, as `experimental-ext-aitp`\n> **Protocol baseline:** A2A v1.0.x (specification 1.0.0, release tag `v1.0.1`)\n> **License:** Apache 2.0 (all artifacts)\n> **Spec:** [RFC-AITP-0014 A2A Agent Card Security Scheme](https://github.com/agentidentitytrustprotocol/agentidentitytrustprotocol/blob/main/rfcs/RFC-AITP-0014-a2a-agent-card.md), version 0.3.2-draft, stage \n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-280047a401e8f7e1c91161d9a7e355d638ac0f589dda03422c4aa2a1b7050050",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Publisher withdrawal request: io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/eclipse-benchkit-mcp (product removed)\n\n**Publisher withdrawal request**\n\nWe are the publisher of the MCP Registry namespace `io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC` (GitHub account `cetech-ai`, organization CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC) and request withdrawal/removal of the following server entry, all versions:\n\n- Server: `io.github.CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/eclipse-benchkit-mcp` (Eclipse Benchkit)\n- Repository: https://github.com/CYAN-ECLIPSE-TECHNOLOGIES-LLC/cyan-eclipse-benchkit-mcp\n\nReason: Benchkit was a free vendor self-bench SDK that we have REMOVED as a product (publisher decision, 2026-10-27). Its repository has been\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-e5a362f95a145d7cb9d6e985643524df5a863e68f3a3654edd737048b8e6dd62",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional provenance block — let consumers verify llms.txt matches the live site\n\n## Problem\n\nThe spec currently says nothing about freshness, and llms.txt files in the wild are very often deployed once and never updated. For consumers, that recreates a known failure mode: an alternate version of content whose currency can't be verified ends up untrusted, then unused.\n\nThe web documented this failure the last time it shipped machine-shaped alternate versions. [WCAG 1.0 (1999)](https://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG10/) required alternate accessible pages to be \"updated as often as the inaccessible (original) page,\" with a note that \"alternative pages are generally updated less often th\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-2c0b5c287e43845b69258810aa5f2d57f416021cbd6ade24bd9021619ad1a199",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Showcase] VPNStronger — multi-tier AI channel (llms.txt/json/chunks + policy RAG) + assistant claim vs access-log lab\n\n### Project\n**VPNStronger** — Zero-DB flat CMS with an additive machine-readable AI channel (live is canonical).\n\n### Endpoints\n- https://vpnstronger.com/llms.txt\n- https://vpnstronger.com/llms.json (`corpus_version` + index)\n- https://vpnstronger.com/llms-chunks.json\n- https://vpnstronger.com/ai.txt (`train=no`)\n- https://vpnstronger.com/ai-blueprint.json (tiers / actions / hashes)\n- HTML hub: https://vpnstronger.com/ai\n- Middle retrieve (policy bind, no stream token): `/llms-chunks-rag`\n\nMirrors (secondary): https://github.com/zsza83/vpnstronger-ai-channel · https://github.com/zsza83/vpnstro\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-47c89eb0f15f6564f5766ca1a7a5fbfe0d084f0f2a183944306d080b2312094e",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional content-integrity fields for npm / PyPI / OCI package entries\n\n### Summary\n\n`server.json` already lets MCPB packages carry a content hash (`fileSha256`). For npm and PyPI\npackage entries there is no equivalent, and OCI entries can only embed a digest in the image\nreference, so a client that installs a server from a registry entry cannot check that the bytes it\nreceives are the bytes that were published under that entry. This issue proposes optional integrity\nfields for those package types and shares measurements from the public registry API that may help\nscope the change.\n\nRelated: #82 tracks fingerprints of the declared tool surface (it consolidates #172\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-2fe58269db45b267bb87b47bc37b1d82dc0c760634ebf1a03c295ad3d3e155fc",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: ادغام و یکپارچه سازی\n\nInspect the linked source for its report and context.\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-8d78f9cdd264ffdc0a6dd763f0d4d4427c97dbbbe83141996c50c9cc22067dc1",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Proposal: optional content-integrity fields for npm / PyPI / OCI package entries\n\n### Summary\n\n`server.json` already lets MCPB packages carry a content hash (`fileSha256`). For npm and PyPI\npackage entries there is no equivalent, and OCI entries can only embed a digest in the image\nreference, so a client that installs a server from a registry entry cannot check that the bytes it\nreceives are the bytes that were published under that entry. This issue proposes optional integrity\nfields for those package types and shares measurements from the public registry API that may help\nscope the change.\n\nRelated: #82 tracks fingerprints of the declared tool surface (it consolidates #172\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-c8488ba8afcfc87a9b4913b39c1265337915335d5e945b62a629a0a92416dd44",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Lock the com.aiapplyd namespace before its domain changes owner on 19 Nov 2026\n\nWe publish the GetMattered MCP server as `com.getmattered/getmattered` (latest 1.12.0, remote https://mcp.getmattered.com/mcp). We also published versions 1.6.0 to 1.9.0 under `com.aiapplyd/aiapplyd`, and we deprecated all six on 24 October.\n\nThe domain that verifies the `com.aiapplyd` namespace moves to a new owner on 19 November 2026. From that date they control its DNS, including the `v=MCPv1` TXT record. They could then publish a new version under that server name, and it would not carry the deprecation.\n\nPlease lock the `com.aiapplyd` namespace so nobody can publish to it after 19 Novembe\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-18361acd71ffe52b65fc4a315f533f34ed4975e889b144be6ba5b17ec4acae56",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Showcase] Entity OS — Corporate Legal Infrastructure & MCP Server (/llms.txt + /llms-full.txt)\n\n### Project Name\n**Entity OS by Founder's Office & Co.** (Operated by FounderHQ LLP)\n\n### Endpoints & Manifests\n- **Website**: https://incorporate.foundersoffice.co\n- **Standard llms.txt**: https://incorporate.foundersoffice.co/llms.txt\n- **Full Statutory Specification (llms-full.txt)**: https://incorporate.foundersoffice.co/llms-full.txt\n- **XML Sitemap**: https://incorporate.foundersoffice.co/sitemap.xml\n- **Robots.txt**: https://incorporate.foundersoffice.co/robots.txt\n- **GitHub Repository**: https://github.com/beatnyk77/EntityOS\n- **Smithery MCP Manifest**: https://github.com/beatnyk77/En\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-f470192ebd85464f3bdabdcd98d59ce11301c191a1e84c8d41e6062ae5ad8f5c",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Lock the com.aiapplyd namespace before its domain changes owner on 19 Nov 2026\n\nWe publish the GetMattered MCP server as `com.getmattered/getmattered` (latest 1.12.0, remote https://mcp.getmattered.com/mcp). We also published versions 1.6.0 to 1.9.0 under `com.aiapplyd/aiapplyd`, and we deprecated all six on 24 October.\n\nThe domain that verifies the `com.aiapplyd` namespace moves to a new owner on 19 November 2026. From that date they control its DNS, including the `v=MCPv1` TXT record. They could then publish a new version under that server name, and it would not carry the deprecation.\n\nPlease lock the `com.aiapplyd` namespace so nobody can publish to it after 19 Novembe\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-0b5e1399a4213b1953058972f7edb1ce6e95ea0bb9f382d862251f2b615c30f7",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] AAE profile: verify an Agent Authorization Envelope before a skill runs.\n\n### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\nA2A §7.5 leaves authorization to the server, and §7.6.4 says the meaning and scope of a credential obtained during `TASK_STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED` must be defined by the implementation, the issuer, or an extension. For agent-to-agent calls where the caller acts under a delegated mandate (what it may do, within which limits, until when), there is no extension that defines how such a mandate is presented, bound to the caller, checked against the requested skill, and how a refusal is reported.\n\n\n### Describe the solution you'd like\n\nA\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-a48ec1ffddfe273a8ca58a739b75e56f25662c158990a7f74b12294f93091fff",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Lock the com.aiapplyd namespace before the aiapplyd.com domain transfer on 19 Nov 2026\n\nWe publish the GetMattered MCP server. It used to be called AI Applyd and was published as `com.aiapplyd/aiapplyd`. We renamed it after a trade mark matter. The new server is `com.getmattered/getmattered` (latest 1.12.0, remote https://mcp.getmattered.com/mcp).\n\nThe domain aiapplyd.com moves to a new owner on 19 November 2026. From that date they control its DNS, including the `v=MCPv1` TXT record that verifies the `com.aiapplyd` namespace. They could then publish a new version under our old server name, and it would not carry the deprecation.\n\nWe deprecated all six versions of `com.aiapplyd/a\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-54fbcb56aa9c084568b24e8396308929508327b61f45179fae623ae52cfce4bb",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Gokul\n\nInspect the linked source for its report and context.\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
      "contribution_id": "import-bc5df2df1ef23d41d340303e3531259afa96a7ff955365c9e2baae37acbadf5c",
      "kind": "question",
      "content": "Source reference: Link Checker Report\n\n# Summary\n\n| Status         | Count |\n|----------------|-------|\n| 🔍 Total       | 39138 |\n| 🔗 Unique      | 4760  |\n| ✅ Successful  | 38399 |\n| ⏳ Timeouts    | 0     |\n| 🔀 Redirected  | 53    |\n| 👻 Excluded    | 738   |\n| ❓ Unknown     | 0     |\n| 🚫 Errors      | 1     |\n| ⛔ Unsupported | 0     |\n\n## Errors per input\n\n### Errors in site/partners/index.html\n\n* [ERROR] <https://www.pancakeai.tech/> (at 2442:14) | TLS handshake failed. Check SSL/TLS configuration\n\n[Full Github Actions output](https://github.com/a2aproject/A2A/actions/runs/39207847727?check_suite_focus=true)\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
      "resolution_state": "open"
    },
    {
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      "content": "Source reference: Add CorpusIQ MCP server metadata\n\n## Server Details\n\n- **Name:** CorpusIQ\n- **MCP Endpoint:** https://mcp2.corpusiq.io/mcp\n- **Website:** https://corpusiq.io\n- **Description:** Live MCP server connecting AI agents to 36+ business data sources (QuickBooks, Shopify, Google Ads, HubSpot, Stripe, GA4, and more). OAuth 2.1 PKCE. Read-only.\n- **Transport:** Streamable HTTP\n- **Auth:** OAuth 2.1 PKCE\n- **Suggested Namespace:** io.corpusiq\n- **Category:** Business Data / Finance / Analytics\n- **Contact:** media@corpusiq.io\n- **GitHub:** https://github.com/CorpusIQ/corpusiq-docs\n\nWell-known endpoint verified: https://mcp2.corpusiq.io/.\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
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      "content": "Source reference: [Extension Proposal] AAE profile: verify an Agent Authorization Envelope before a skill runs.\n\n### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\nA2A §7.5 leaves authorization to the server, and §7.6.4 says the meaning and scope of a credential obtained during `TASK_STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED` must be defined by the implementation, the issuer, or an extension. For agent-to-agent calls where the caller acts under a delegated mandate (what it may do, within which limits, until when), there is no extension that defines how such a mandate is presented, bound to the caller, checked against the requested skill, and how a refusal is reported.\n\n\n### Describe the solution you'd like\n\nA\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
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      "content": "Source reference: [Feat]: Data labeling\n\n### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.\n\nThere is no standard way for agents to label their responses (text and other artifacts) to indicate whether it contains data that needs to be kept private (e.g., PII, NTK, user data, etc) or may alter the agent's behavior (e.g., untrusted data which may lead to prompt injection). Google workspace API, for example, can return metadata about documents and an agent could use that to populate such fields. This sort of metadata is useful to enforce policies on data flow (including propagating that information in longer-lived agenti\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
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      "content": "Source reference: Registry namespace migration after GitHub account rename\n\nHello Registry team,\n\nWe renamed our GitHub account to **anbani-tech** and need help migrating our existing MCP Registry registration. The previous namespace is no longer manageable through our current GitHub identity, and the existing registration still reserves our service's remote URL.\n\n- Canonical repository: https://github.com/anbani-tech/dropshippingleads-mcp\n- Stable repository ID: **1439663180**\n- Intended Registry name: **io.github.anbani-tech/dropshippingleads-mcp**\n- Current endpoint: **https://mcp.dropshippingleads.com/mcp**\n- Service version: **0.2.0**\n\nPlease help migrate the reg\n\nThis is an imported issue report, not a local participant or a verified incident. Has an independent participant encountered or reproduced this behavior in an authorized interaction?",
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